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 In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We 
characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual conditionals that can 
exhibit different degrees of contingency. We use the idea of possible worlds to say 
that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve 
numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific 
research. We defend that, in part, it is this structure what helps explain why 
idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific 
practice.  
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1. Introduction  
Although there is a unanimous consensus with respect to the fact that idealization is a usual 
resource in scientific reasoning and an essential aspect in the construction of theories, there 
is not the same consensus in the use of the term “idealization” and consequently, there is no 
unique systematic approach to treat idealizations and to understand their role within the 
structure of scientific theories. The situation seems to be more dramatic in the case of 
idealizations in biology surely because there are many ways of understanding the 
relationship between models, ideal conditions and the real world. A quick survey of the 
biological literature shows that idealizations are routinely used in different contexts: for 
example, they could be used for model construction, in the constitution of concepts or 
entities highly dependent on a given theory or in the form of causal hypothesis of a certain 
degree of abstraction which refer to the supposed mechanisms necessary to explain 
biological processes. As idealizations can be understood in different ways, any attempt to 
characterize them must not only account for its diversity but must also create a framework 
that can help us understand its success in scientific practice. This will be our goal in this 
paper. We will argue that idealizations in biology do not occur in isolation in the context of 
particular models or theories, but rather form a network of multilevel idealizations and it is 
this network what in part explains the diversity of idealizations and its widespread use in 
science. Speaking of a “network” does not commit us to any particular structure or any 
particular logic that could represent it, it only has the purpose of highlighting the fact that 
idealizations are not isolated entities, but quite at the contrary, they are linked entities 
belonging to a more complex structure. Idealizations are here understood as statements that 
are usually known to be false in the actual world but nevertheless hold or would hold under 
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certain conditions. These conditions can depart from the actual world in a major or minor 
degree, that is, they can differ in their “degree of contingency” in a sense that will be 
explained later (see section 3).  
The argument will be presented as follows: First (section 2) we will argue that there 
are many different ways of idealizing in biology. We will present some of the products of 
such idealizations and will defend that such diversity has to do with the internal structure of 
the idealization. Then (section 3), we will present such structure and will defend that it 
helps explain two of the most salient characteristics of idealizations: on one hand its 
diversity and on the other, why, despite being deformations of reality, they are so 
successfully used in scientific practice. Finally, in section 4, we will illustrate it all with the 
example of the Wright-Fisher model 
2. Different forms of idealizing.  
One of the main problems we find in current accounts of idealization is that they analyze 
idealizations in biology as if they were all of the same kind. This is to say, they have not 
realized that idealizations in biology are used for numerous and distinct claims within a 
given framework and have consequently failed to properly analyze the different roles these 
idealizations play in theoretical accounts. There can be alternative ways of characterizing 
the different kinds of idealizations, for example, in terms of the processes and goals behind 
idealizing or in terms of the practice and the products of idealization.  
For example, according to Weisberg (2007), there are three kinds of idealization: 1) 
Galilean, whose goal is to simplify complex phenomena to make it more tractable, 2) 
minimalist, that aims to discover the primary causal factors that account for the 
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phenomenon that is to be explained, and 3) the multiple-models idealization, that pretends 
to understand nature through the construction of different models, which are related but 
incompatible with each other. As we can see, these kinds of idealization are distinguished 
according to their different goals in biological model-building and practice, that is, 
according to different “representational ideals” –as Weisberg calls them. In Weisberg 
(2006, 633), he says that “[e]numerating the representational ideals associated with the 
idealization approach is very difficult, for there are infinitely many ways to idealize, only 
some of them valuable.” But in Weisberg (2007), he tries to give a refined theory of 
idealization based on the different goals and epistemic virtues idealizations can exhibit. We 
agree with Weisberg that idealization can have many different justifications based on such 
goals and that these three kinds of idealizations are not necessarily competitors in the sense 
that only one of the three should better capture the essence of idealizing in science. Quite at 
the contrary, all three reflect different legitimate ways of idealizing in scientific practice. 
Weisberg’s classification seems to be very appropriate at the epistemic level, that is, 
if we want to identify the epistemic virtues and goals behind idealizing and to provide a 
justification for the different kinds of idealization. But, in the present article, we want to 
develop a different approach which has more to do with the role idealizations occupy 
within the structure of scientific (particularly biological) theories. For this reason, our 
account will be based on the different products of idealizing (for example, the result of a set 
of idealizations can be an idealized theory or a particular idealized law). These different 
products occupy different and characteristic roles within scientific activity. From the wide 
set of products idealization can produce, we have selected four for expository reasons 
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(theories, laws, data models and mechanisms); we could have added for example, 
metaphors or intertheoretic relations1 as well.  
Let us now present a list of different kinds of idealizations focusing on the products 
rather than on the goals. Of course, the list does not pretend to be exhaustive.  
Idealizations in biology can occur:  
 
• in the form of idealized laws, such as Mendelian laws, Fisher’s Fundamental 
Theorem or the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. In each of these cases, the 
idealization purports an idealized (generally mathematical) description of the world. 
For example, the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium talks about an idealized population 
of constant size, where there is no natural selection, no mutations and individuals 
show no tendency to choose partners with particular traits (mating is totally 
random). These idealizations are necessary for Hardy-Weinberg to then introduce 
its classical mathematical description of allelic frequency (p2 + 2pq + q2) and 
discuss the different factors that might perturb the equilibrium. 
 
 in the form of complex idealized systems, i.e. (biological) theories: these theories 
are said to be idealized because they contain ideal concepts and idealized laws as 
essential components. For example, Darwin’s theory of evolution or immunology’s 
Clonal Selection Theory (see for example, Tauber 1994) are not the cold, objective 
result of observation and empirical data but rather, complex apparatuses formed in 
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part (or even guided by) idealizations in the form of metaphors, ontological 
commitments, heuristics or simplifications of world’s phenomena.  
 
• in the form of causal hypothesis of a certain degree of abstraction which refer to the 
supposed mechanisms necessary to explain biological processes (see for instance 
(Bechtel and Richardson 1993, Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000, or Wimsatt 
1986). In these cases, a mechanism is an idealized explanatory process of a certain 
physiological phenomenon, for instance the mechanisms of cellular communication 
where there is an orchestrated sequence of proteic, cellular and genetic signals that 
explain how cells “communicate” with each other. Likewise, we could mention 
DNA replication, protein synthesis or axonal growth, biological phenomena that are 
explained by these kinds of idealized systems. 
 
• in the construction of data models. Here idealizations deal with the constitution of 
data that are more and more dependent on theoretical interests. For example, in 
immunology, where the characterization of at least the T- and B-cells was based on 
the clonal selection theory (Bretscher and Cohn 1970). Based on their original 
paper, Bretscher and Cohn needed to make such a distinction to satisfy some of the 
premises of the theory.  
 
These examples show some of the different theoretical and methodological forms 
idealizations can take in biology. These different forms can be used to construct models, or 
in theory development, or to produce certain kinds of explanations (as in the case of 
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mechanisms). However, this does not mean that there are particular idealizations suitable 
for specific purposes:  there is not a “type A” idealization used to construct models or a 
“type B” idealization used to formulate law-like generalizations. What we have is a general 
tool whose diversity makes it suitable for different empirical, heuristic or epistemic tasks in 
biology. If this is correct, then we are entitled to ask why? How come idealizations can 
serve so many different purposes? Why, despite being intentional distortions of reality, they 
can be used in scientific practice? In what follows, we will discuss that these different 
forms of idealizing have a common structure, and that they are organized in a particular 
way. We will show this in the particular case of an idealized model (the Wright-Fisher 
model), but it is our belief that this account can be applied to all the other types of 
idealization mentioned: as we will see, biological theories or models are actually composed 
of different kinds of idealizations forming a network that is in part responsible for their 
heuristic and explanatory power.  
3. The network of multi-level idealizations  
All the different kinds of idealization presented in section 2 can be treated as cases of 
idealization as it is understood in this section.  
According to the approach we will develop here, an idealization is to be understood 
as a part (more specifically the consequent) of a subjunctive, mainly counterfactual, 
conditional. Idealizations are currently understood as statements that are known to be false 
in the actual world, holding rather under certain counterfactual conditions, that is, in certain 
possible worlds. We also propose including as idealizations suppositions that hold in 
(sometimes highly) hypothetical conditions expressed in subjunctive form.  
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For example, we are thinking in statements such as “What if organisms could live at 
temperatures above 1000º C”. It could be argued that this statement cannot hold in the 
actual world, because the usual chemical components that constitute organisms (for ex. 
carbon, hydrogen, or nitrogen) cannot associate in these conditions. However, it could 
happen that there are life forms made of other elements (for ex. some metal) that could live 
under such conditions2. For the last three decades, we know that there are 
hypertermophylic bacteria, like Thermus thermophilus, that grow above 100 ºC. 
(Furthermore, we now know that organisms such as colwellia need temperatures below -
20°C to grow and there are reports of such bacteria having basal activity at temperatures 
going from -80 to -120°C3.) Any statement considering such organisms before the 
identification of hyperthermophyles would have been as highly hypothetical as the previous 
example.  
By imagining hypothetical and counterfactual conditions we are departing more or 
less from the actual world, that is, we can remain farther or closer to it. This idea resembles 
Lewis’ notion of distance between possible worlds, where the actual world is fixed by a 
particular context (for ex. the principles of a certain theory or family of theories and the 
background knowledge in a certain time). In a broader philosophical discussion, Nozick 
(2001: 148-155) has highlighted the importance of distinguishing between different 
“degrees of contingency”, meaning that statements that are contingently false can be true in 
possible worlds that differ from our actual world in a very different manner. We will use 
the same term, degree of contingency, to mean that idealizations can differ in many 
different ways from the actual world. In short, we will use Lewis’ notion of distance 
between possible worlds but that does not mean that we endorse his particular semantics of 
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counterfactual conditionals (maybe another semantics could serve as well). One important 
difference is that we accept counterfactuals where the antecedent is true, that is, we do not 
commit ourselves to the thesis that the use of a counterfactual implies that the antecedent is 
always false4. However, we do agree with Lewis that counterfactuals are related to a kind 
of condition
in Jones (2005), but, as far as we know, none of them has developed it 
with enough detail. 
alizations hold. For illustration purposes let us 
onsider a caricature of natural selection:  
 
al based on “comparative similarity of possible worlds” (Lewis 1973: 8).  
The idea of different degrees of idealization has been suggested by previous authors, 
for example by Mart
Let us now begin by introducing some terminology. As we have said, idealizations 
are statements that are the consequent of certain subjunctive (or counterfactual) 
conditionals, where the antecedent expresses the ideal or hypothetical conditions under 
which the idealization holds. For the whole conditional we will use the term ideal-
hypothetical case, for the antecedent we will use the term ideal-hypothetical conditions. 
The consequent will be called idealization. The structure will then be: C1,…, Cn → 
S1,…,Sk, where C1,…, Cn are the ideal-hypothetical conditions, S1,…,Sk are the 
idealizations, and the connective “→” could be understood according to Lewis’ analysis of 
subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals.  Ideal-hypothetical conditions should make 
explicit the possible worlds in which ide
c
If, in a given population, every individual is unique and different in some ways from 
all other individuals within that population (C1), all variable traits are inherited from 
parent to offspring (C2), the population size can increase to infinity (C3) and, if food 
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supply is limited (C4) → There is an unequal ability of individuals to survive and 
reproduce that leads to a gradual change in a population, with favorable 
characteristics accumulating over generations (S).  
 (for example, Weisberg 2006a, 2006b, 2007, Cartwright 1989 and 
1983, or Levins 1966).  
 
In this example, the idealization “natural selection” (S) consists of four conditional 
statements represented by C1 to C4. In other words, our natural selection is built on four 
ideal conditions that not only help us to understand what the idealization is about, but also 
set the conditions under which the idealization holds. As we will explain shortly, these 
conditions share some characteristics that in part explain why idealizations are so useful in 
scientific practice. Here it is important to notice that idealization is not synonymous to 
abstraction: the idea is not to handpick relevant parameters and pretend nothing else 
matters, quite on the contrary, the idea is to knowingly create a false vision of the world 
and to use such “lie” as a powerful scientific tool. The idealization can then be used to test 
a model, to use it as a heuristic device to develop new theories or to test the limits of nature 
with questions like what would happen if… and a long list of other uses as has been 
explored in the literature
We contend idealizations can do all that, because they are composed of different 
elements each being closer or farther apart from the actual world. In scientific practice, the 
idealization is not tested as a unit but different questions target one or some of the elements 
forming an idealization network. Consider our example where the idealization that there is 
natural selection could be tested by searching for ways offspring could inherit 
characteristics from their parents, or by seeing if it is indeed true that all members of a 
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population are unique or perhaps by seeing what happens when large populations live on 
scarce resources. As each of these conditions could be harder or easier to test, the 
idealization as a whole can exhibit a great deal of cognitive, epistemic and heuristic virtues. 
For example, consider the case where none of the conditions hold in the actual world and 
therefore will never lead to any empirical result. In this case, the idealization as a whole 
could still have heuristic, epistemic or cognitive power as its highly idealized conditions 
could open ways to construct new models, to improve on existing theories, or to come up 
with means to make such conditions applicable (to bring them closer to our world). Now 
consider the opposite situation, that where all of the ideal conditions are closer to the actual 
world and can be subject to experimentation. In this scenario, the idealization as a whole 
will eventually lead to concretizations and could become an important tool for empirical 
research. The general idea is that, due to its internal structure, idealizations can exhibit 
different degrees of contingency and it is this combination what in part explains why 
idealizations are so useful for scientific practice.  
This idea is in some important aspects related to Mitchell’s dimensions of scientific 
law (Mitchell 1999). Mitchell presents a novel account of scientific laws in biology based 
on the idea that there is only a difference of degree between accidental generalizations and 
scientific laws (she uses the expression “continuum of contingency” ranging from 
accidental truths to highly idealized laws.) This degree could be measured in terms of 
strength, abstraction and stability (invariance). Likewise, what we propose for the case of 
idealizations is that they also show degrees of contingency ranging from those closer to our 
world to those farther apart from it.  In our work, we distinguish four particular cases but as 
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in her 
ilar to that of Lewis.   
(i) At the highest degree of contingency, we find the cases where C1,…, Cn are completely 
 can be found in the 
(ii) Then we would find the case where C1,…, Cn are contingently false and conflict with a 
 be to assume that there is no mutation or that there is no natural 
(iii) Then we find cases in which C1,…, Cn are also contingently false but do not conflict 
live in isolation but could be achieved experimentally. In the same way, in genetic 
trait even if we know that physiological processes are the result of a larger genetic network: 
case, it could also be a continuum following a notion of distance between possible 
worlds sim
The ideal-hypothetical conditions can have different degrees of contingency as 
follows: 
idealized, in the sense that they are ideal-types or limiting-conditions that conflict with 
some theoretical principle. In biology, for example, such idealizations
construction of models in population genetics where there are infinite populations. We will 
use the term “abstracting ideal condition” (AI) to refer this case. 
well-established regularity in some or another field of biology. For example, in population 
genetics the case would
selection. We will call “nomologically non-possible ideal condition” (NONPI) such 
conditions. 
explicitly with a well-established regularity. In any case, we have strong reasons to believe 
that they are false in the actual world and can only be approximately met under 
experimental control; for example, the assumption made in population genetics according 
to which there is no migration does not hold in the actual world because populations do not 
regulation models two or three genes can be considered to be responsible for a particular 
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although we know that a certain factor or parameter is present, we can isolate it in order to 
make easier the understanding of a phenomenon; in Levins’ words, we sacrifice realism for 
t very high temperatures. We will call this 
ideal condition” (IMPI). 
  
precision and generality. We will call “experimental ideal condition” (EI) such case.  
(iv) Finally, we can distinguish cases in which C1,…, Cn are purely contingent, that despite 
not seeming plausible, we do not even know if they are possible in the actual world. For 
example, the previous case of organisms living a
final case “implausible 
 
Of course, with the present classification we don’t pretend to be exhaustive. There could be 
other kinds of idealization (recall that the difference is only of degree and that in fact, we 
could admit a whole continuum of idealizations). Even so, it is clear that this classification 
is presenting some paradigmatic cases of idealization according to their degree of 
contingency. Furthermore, it is very important to remember that an idealization is not 
understood here as an independent entity, it is rather a network formed by different ideal 
conditions that interact with each other to accomplish three main goals: first, to express 
what the idealization is about, second to form different degrees of contingency and third, as 
a consequence of the different degrees of contingency, to turn idealizations into a 
polyvalent scientific tool. As we have seen, idealizations can be understood in many 
different ways. We believe that one of the reasons idealizations are so versatile is its 
structure: because ideal conditions can exhibit different degrees of contingency, they can 
serve different methodological, experimental or theoretical needs. Remember the list 
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presented in section 2 where we mentioned four different products of idealization: if they 
are now seen through the proposed framework, we will notice that mathematical models 
such as Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium need highly idealized conditions to play the role of a 
null hypothesis. That mechanisms (in the sense explored by Machamer, Darden and Craver 
2000) need conditions that are closer to our world because they are constructed mostly from 
empirical data and presumably, refer to the causal entities responsible for a physiological 
processes, or that data models must be formed by both kinds of conditions given that they 
5
ir degree of contingency, ranging from those closer to our 
se farther from it: 
 
rely on the theory but predict the existence of certain entities .  
In the following diagram, we want to represent the different types of idealization we have 
distinguished according to the
world to tho
  
Figure 1. Diagram representing the degree of contingency for different idealized conditions 
ing to their distance from our world. See text for details.   accord
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4. The idealizational structure of the Wright-Fisher model.  
example coming from population genetics. As was briefly summarized in section 2, in 
philosophy of biology, so many readers will be already acquainted with the example and 
beauty of population genetics is that everything is kept simple and straightforward, so that 
e idealizations come from and how they are being used in scientific 
 Wright-Fisher Model 
 
 
To better understand what we bear in mind, we will exemplify our approach with an 
biology, idealizations can be found in different forms and accordingly, can accomplish 
different methodological, epistemic, heuristic or cognitive functions. Evidently, biology is a 
rich field where many different examples can be taken from but we chose the Wright-Fisher 
model for three important reasons: population genetics is one of the most popular fields in 
will make it easier for us to explain what we have in mind (for instance in Walsh 2002, 
there is a very nice discussion on this model). Furthermore, being mathematized, it is an 
easy example for people not familiar with biology (had we chosen some other field, we 
would have had to explain very detailed physiological mechanisms). Finally, because the 
it is easy to see where th
practice.   
 
4.1
Fisher and Wright developed separately this model in a series of works (see Fisher 1930 
and Wright 1931) and was inspired by their disagreement on the importance of genetic 
drift. Therefore, the basic idea behind the model is to describe how gene frequencies (the 
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number of a given gene in the population) change within a population by chance alone. To 
achieve this, the model studies an ideal population (sometimes called Wright-Fisher 
spie 2004) under the following ideal conditions:  
ulation is diploid, finite and constant (every generation will have N 
etes are drawn at random to constitute the N diploid 
gamete pool. 
 breed.  
pulation.  
10) There are no overlapping generations. 
 with two alleles A1 and A2 we have:  
  
o j copies of A1 in the next generation is given by the binomial probability 
distribution6: 
population, see for example Gille
(C1) Mutation is not occurring.  
(C2) Natural selection is not occurring.  
(C3) The pop
individuals).  
(C4) Adults make an infinite number of gametes having the same allele frequency.  
(C5) From the pool in (C4), 2N gam
individuals for the next generation.  
(C6) Every parent contributes equally to the 
(C7) All members of the population
(C8) All mating is totally random.  
 (C9) There is no migration in or out of the po
(C
 
Now, for the case of a single locus
it = number of A1 alleles in time t. 
pt = it/2N, the frequency of allele A1 in time t. 
qt= pt-1, the frequency of allele A2 in time t.  
Because there is an infinite number of gametes, the transition probability of going from i 
copies of A1 t
17 
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(1)      
From (1) we have that the conditional expectation7 of a given allelic frequency is:     
       (2)                
where it can be seen the important result that there is no net change in allele frequency 
betwee
There are other details about this model but for our purposes this will suffice. Notice 
some of which could hold in the actual world and some others that definitely cannot. As 
of contingency what explains why this model has been and still is so useful in population 
genetics. If we take a closer look at each ideal condition, we will notice that: (C1) and (C2) 
selection. In our analysis these are nomologically non-possible ideal conditions (type ii) 
will serve epistemic or heuristic purposes, for example, to wonder what the effect of 
mutations could be on a given allelic frequency by modeling what happens when the genes 
of an entire population are invariant. (C4) is clearly an abstracting ideal condition (type i) 
as no adult can make an infinite number of gametes. As it happens with (C1) and (C2), this 
particular example, (C4) helps to envision the idea that it does not matter how many alleles 
n generations.   
that the Wright-Fisher model is heavily idealized: it is composed of 10 ideal conditions 
said before, we contend that it is this combination of conditions exhibiting different degrees 
are highly idealized, there cannot be a population not undergoing mutation and natural 
given that they conflict with known regularities. However, the idea is that these conditions 
condition gives the whole idealization epistemic, heuristic and cognitive virtues. In this 
18 
 
Idealization and the Structure of Theories                                                              Arroyo and de Donato     
there a
phenomena, it could be of little use in actual scientific practice. This is why the idealization 
condition (type iv), given that we know that not all the members of a given population will 
experimental ideal condition (type iii), given that it could be approximated under certain 
e parents die shortly 
after la
re, but if they are really chosen at random they will eventually have a predictable 
frequency.  
 Up to here, Wright-Fisher seems to be talking about impossible things, it is an 
idealization that could serve certain epistemic virtues but having no contact with nature’s 
must also include conditions that are closer to our world. Wright-Fisher achieves this with 
conditions (C3) and (C5) to (C10): (C7) is a condition that could be met in the actual world, 
but in most cases (for example packs of wolves or troops of primates where males mate 
according to their hierarchy within the flock), it may be considered an implausible ideal 
breed and produce offspring. (C8) looks possible because in principle mating does seem to 
be random, only that we know sexual selection in general, and culture when dealing 
specifically with human populations turn the outcome not to be so random at all; therefore 
it is an implausible ideal condition (type iv). Likewise (C9) may be considered as an 
experimental conditions (for example, we could approximate it by placing a particular 
population in an isolated area). On the other hand, (C10) is something that happens in the 
real world, think for instance in the cases of cicadas or salmon wher
ying the eggs. However, (C10) is aimed at any population so for other cases it could 
only be approximated under experimental conditions.  
(C3), (C5) and (C6) are so close to our world that they do not seem to be idealized 
at all. In the case of (C3), we know lots of organisms are diploid, populations are certainly 
finite but under real conditions, there is no way the population will remain constant across 
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generations, that is, it is impossible that the population will have the same number of 
individuals generation after generation. However, such a condition could be achieved under 
experimental conditions. Therefore, this is what we call an experimental ideal condition 
(type iii).  
Finally, (C5) and (C6) seem trivial, we all know that parents normally contribute 
equally to their daughters’ genetic heritage and that the gametes involved are completely 
random. However, (C5) and (C6) are not individual conditions but form part of a larger one 
that includes (C3) and (C4). The whole condition talks about an ideal population where its 
members produce an infinite number of gametes that are all thrown into a basket, shuffled 
and drawn at random to produce the next generation. Notice that under this scenario, 
individuals are the least of our concerns because all that matters is that there are 2N genes 
and that some of them are alleles A1 and A2. Following this logic, our population could 
very well be monoecious (producing both gametes) but that does not mean Fisher and 
Wright only cared about hermaphrodites, what happens is that (C5) and (C6) are terribly 
idealized conditions that form part of an abstracting ideal condition formed by (C3)-(C6). 
Now, just for the sake of argument, if what we have just said is correct, what should we do 
with conditions (C7) and (C8) that specifically talk about parents? Let us remember that 
Wright-Fisher needs them for empirical reasons, the idealization formed by C3, C4, C5 and 
C6 is so abstract the model would again lose contact with natural phenomena. Idealizing 
that even under such conditions, parents should behave in a certain way for their offspring 
to become a Wright-Fisher population, opens the gate for possible experimental testing in 
the sense of approximations if real populations are considered and some of the conditions 
are relaxed (what actually happens in scientific practice, see for example Jorde and Ryman 
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2007, Skalski (2007), Waples and Yokota (2007) and Kitikado et al (2006). Finally, the 
idealization C3-C4-C5-C6 also shows how the whole idealization is not simply formed by a 
number of conditions but these conditions also interact between one another to form new 
idealizations. This is then, another very important sense in which idealizations form a 
mu
 is introduced (see for 
example, Naglyaki 1979, Kimura 1954)). This shows that it is not a particular idealization, 
but the entire network, what does the heuristic and epistemic work.  
lti-level network.  
 
Wright-Fisher model has been used as an example to show how it is the combination of 
low and high-level ideal conditions what in part is responsible for the model’s success. This 
model has not only been used to study genetic drift but for example, associated to 
Kingman’s coalescent theory (Kingman 1982) is currently used for numerous studies of 
human evolution (See for example, Helgason 2003, Kingman 2000 or Labate 1999) The 
idea is that while the model itself may be highly idealized, its conditions can be relaxed, 
meaning, as we said before, that different conditions can be targeted for concretizations (for 
example, introducing a mutation factor that will affect all genes in the gene pool (C4), or by 
exploring what happens if selection or even random genetic drift
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Figure 2. Visual representation for Wright-Fisher’s idealization network. The figure is 
meant only for illustration purposes and should not be taken as representing an actual 
idealization network. Here, the Wright-Fisher model is represented by the whole structure, 
nodes represent its 10 idealized conditions, and continuous lines illustrate how all of them 
work in unison to express the idealization. Finally, dotted lines represent possible relations 
not discussed on the text but are used to represent that the ideal conditions can interact 
between them to make new idealizations like that made by conditions C3, C4, C5 and C6 
(see text for further details).  
 
5. Conclusion.  
Certainly, there has been a lot of discussion about idealization in biology, but most of it 
centered on model and theory construction (for example, Keller 2000, Godfrey-Smith 
2006a and 2006b, Griesemer 1990, Levins 1966, Wimsatt 1987, or even Weisberg 2007).  
We agree with them that idealization is indeed important in these cases, but in the present 
article we have aimed to show that idealizations cover many other scientific activities that 
can also include data models, concept formation or intertheoretical relations. We have 
argued that this can happen because idealizations are not individual entities used in 
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isolation in the context of model construction, but are a network of multilevel idealizations. 
This network is constituted by idealized conditions of different degrees of contingency and, 
as has been shown in the case of the Wright-Fisher model, it is the interaction of these 
conditions what gives the idealization numerous virtues.  The idea is that the more highly 
idealized conditions enrich the model (or law or theory) with many different heuristic and 
epistemic virtues; whereas those conditions that are closer to the actual world give the 
idealization empirical power in the sense of concretizations, highly idealized conditions 
help formulate problems, envision possible solutions, or formulate ways such abstract 
conditions can be applied in the real world. As Wimsatt has put it, “an oversimplified 
model may act as a starting point in a series of models of increasing complexity and 
realism.” (Wimsatt 1987:30). As can be seen, idealizations work together and this 
important feature is what we have tried to capture through the metaphor of a network. 
Despite the fact that we have only exemplified this approach in the case of a model, it is our 
belief that the same framework could be used in any of the other kinds of idealizations 
discussed. As we are here introducing this account, it would be interesting to study other 
cases and above all, to use this discussion in relation to other topics related to idealization 
such as explanation and scientific realism. 
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NOTES 
 
1 For example, in intertheoretical reduction, Schaffner’s General Reduction-Replacement model (Schaffner 
1967, 1992) needs "corrected" reducing and reduced theories, this is, idealized conditions reducing and 
reduced theories have to meet for reduction to take place. 
2 As, for example, has been argued by Cleland & Copley 2005 
3 See for example, Junge et al.  (2006) 
4 See for example Woods 1997 
5 For a similar notion to that of “degree of contingency”, but in relation to scientific laws and the concept of 
invariance, see for example  Lange (1999) and Mitchell (2000). 
6 To keep things tidy, just remember that in this and following equations, i=it and j=it+1. 
7 Also known as the mean of the binomial distribution. 
